Books by "Allan R. Millett"
5 books found
Toward a Consensus on Military Service
by Andrew J. Goodpaster, Lloyd H. Elliott, J. Allan Hovey
2016 · Elsevier
Toward a Consensus on Military Service: Report of the Atlantic Council's Working Group on Military Service compiles the work of several authors who are all members of Working Group on Military service. Each chapter tackles relevant issues regarding the U.S. peacetime military volunteer force, such as its previous experiences and future prospects. The opening chapter covers the setting, which in turn provides a geopolitical overview of the issues faced by the U.S. military. The next chapter discusses the history of American military recruitment system, from colonial times up to the last draft era. Chapter 3 tackles the present and future of the U.S. security requirements, while the next chapter discusses the concept of an all-volunteer force as well as its implications. The fifth chapter provides an analysis of the experience and prospects of military reserves in the all-volunteer era. Chapter 6 discusses the possible repercussions of an all-volunteer forces as well as the possible remedy of such predicament. Chapter 7 explains several recruitment options for both active and reserve forces, while the Chapter 8 discusses the use of a compulsory military service when an all-volunteer system is proven inadequate. The ninth chapter examines the relationship between how the U.S. military builds up its military manpower and how it affects U.S. society both morally and ethically. The last chapter provides recommendation based on the information inferred from the previous chapter.
Part I deals with the evolution of military strategy and doctrine, from the Napoleonic Wars to today. Contributors look at the influence of great military thinkers, such as Carl von Clausewitz, on the armed forces of the Western world and examine how previous military leaders dealt with issues similar to those faced today, such as the effects of technology on strategy, the significance of the operational level of war, and ways of restructuring the armed forces in times of uncertainty and change. Part II examines warfare at the end of this century. Examples of the development of revolutionary warfare in Asia from Mao to Giap are used to underscore the cultural and situational influences on doctrines of revolutionary war. Part III looks at the future of conflict in the twenty-first century. Contributors investigate diverse issues, including the impact of computers on warfare, the effect of media coverage on strategy, space policy, arms control in the post-Cold War era, political systems and their relationship to the probability of war, and the prospects of stealth technology. In an era when armed forces around the world have come under increasing scrutiny and criticism, this collection of essays provides valuable lessons that may avert future military mistakes.
Based on letters and diaries of more than a thousand soldiers, political scientist Joseph Allan Frank describes how political considerations were central to the development of the armies of the North and South--motivating soldiers, shaping officers, and assuring military cohesion. Illustrations.
When the major powers sent troops to the Korean peninsula in June of 1950, it supposedly marked the start of one of the last century's bloodiest conflicts. In volume 1, Allan Millett, however, reveals that the Korean War actually began with partisan clashes two years earlier and had roots in the political history of Korea under Japanese rule, 1910-1945. In volume 2, he shifts his focus to the twelve-month period from North Korea's invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950, through the end of June 1951 -- the most active phase of the internationalized "Korean War."
Why do democracies win wars? This is a critical question in the study of international relations, as a traditional view--expressed most famously by Alexis de Tocqueville--has been that democracies are inferior in crafting foreign policy and fighting wars. In Democracies at War, the first major study of its kind, Dan Reiter and Allan Stam come to a very different conclusion. Democracies tend to win the wars they fight--specifically, about eighty percent of the time. Complementing their wide-ranging case-study analysis, the authors apply innovative statistical tests and new hypotheses. In unusually clear prose, they pinpoint two reasons for democracies' success at war. First, as elected leaders understand that losing a war can spell domestic political backlash, democracies start only those wars they are likely to win. Secondly, the emphasis on individuality within democratic societies means that their soldiers fight with greater initiative and superior leadership. Surprisingly, Reiter and Stam find that it is neither economic muscle nor bandwagoning between democratic powers that enables democracies to win wars. They also show that, given societal consent, democracies are willing to initiate wars of empire or genocide. On the whole, they find, democracies' dependence on public consent makes for more, rather than less, effective foreign policy. Taking a fresh approach to a question that has long merited such a study, this book yields crucial insights on security policy, the causes of war, and the interplay between domestic politics and international relations.