Books by "Biological Laboratory (Cold Spring Harbor, N.Y.)"

12 books found

The Biological Laboratory

The Biological Laboratory

by Biological Laboratory (Cold Spring Harbor, N.Y.)

1929

Annual Announcement

Annual Announcement

by Marine Biological Laboratory (Woods Hole, Mass.)

1905

Annual Announcement - Marine Biological Laboratory

Annual Announcement - Marine Biological Laboratory

by Marine Biological Laboratory (Woods Hole, Mass.)

1927

Annual Report of the Biological Laboratory

Annual Report of the Biological Laboratory

by Biological Laboratory (Cold Spring Harbor, N.Y.)

1929

Report

Report

by Marine Biological Laboratory (Woods Hole, Mass.)

1912

Determining Core Capabilities in Chemical and Biological Defense Science and Technology

Determining Core Capabilities in Chemical and Biological Defense Science and Technology

by National Research Council, Division on Earth and Life Studies, Board on Life Sciences, Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology, Committee on Determining Core Capabilities in Chemical and Biological Defense Research and Development

2013 · National Academies Press

The goal of the U.S. Department of Defense's (DoD's) Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) is to provide support and world-class capabilities enabling he U.S. Armed Forces to fight and win decisively in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) environments. To accomplish this objective, the CBDP must maintain robust science and technology capabilities to support the research, development, testing, and evaluation required for the creation and validation of the products the program supplies. The threat from chemical and biological attack evolves due to the changing nature of conflict and rapid advances in science and technology (S&T), so the core S&T capabilities that must be maintained by the CBDP must also continue to evolve. In order to address the challenges facing the DoD, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Chemical and Biological Defense (CBD) asked the National Research Council (NRC) to conduct a study to identify the core capabilities in S&T that must be supported by the program. The NRC Committee on Determining Core Capabilities in Chemical and Biological Defense Research and Development examined the capabilities necessary for the chemical and biological defense S&T program in the context of the threat and of the program's stated mission and priorities. Determining Core Capabilities in Chemical and Biological Defense Science and Technology contains the committee's findings and recommendations. It is intended to assist the DASD CBD in determining the best strategy for acquiring, developing, and/or maintaining the needed capabilities.

Contributions from the Biological Laboratory

Contributions from the Biological Laboratory

by Brown University. Biological Laboratory

1927

The papers which are collected in this ... volume of Contributions have been written by officers or students in the Department of biology of Brown University, and have recently appeared in various scientific journals. In the table of contents and on the title-page of each paper will be found the place and time of publication.

Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-Containment Biological Laboratories

Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-Containment Biological Laboratories

by Committee on Anticipating Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-Containment Biological Laboratories, Board on Life Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Division on Earth and Life Studies, Policy and Global Affairs, National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council

2012 · National Academies Press

During July 10-13, 2011, 68 participants from 32 countries gathered in Istanbul, Turkey for a workshop organized by the United States National Research Council on Anticipating Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-containment Biological Laboratories. The United States Department of State's Biosecurity Engagement Program sponsored the workshop, which was held in partnership with the Turkish Academy of Sciences. The international workshop examined biosafety and biosecurity issues related to the design, construction, maintenance, and operation of high-containment biological laboratories- equivalent to United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention biological safety level 3 or 4 labs. Although these laboratories are needed to characterize highly dangerous human and animal pathogens, assist in disease surveillance, and produce vaccines, they are complex systems with inherent risks. Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-Containment Biological Laboratories summarizes the workshop discussion, which included the following topics: Technological options to meet diagnostic, research, and other goals; Laboratory construction and commissioning; Operational maintenance to provide sustainable capabilities, safety, and security; and Measures for encouraging a culture of responsible conduct. Workshop attendees described the history and current challenges they face in their individual laboratories. Speakers recounted steps they were taking to improve safety and security, from running training programs to implementing a variety of personnel reliability measures. Many also spoke about physical security, access controls, and monitoring pathogen inventories. Workshop participants also identified tensions in the field and suggested possible areas for action.

Test and Evaluation of Biological Standoff Detection Systems

Test and Evaluation of Biological Standoff Detection Systems

by National Research Council, Division on Earth and Life Studies, Board on Life Sciences, Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology, Committee on Test and Evaluation of Biological Standoff Detection Systems

2008 · National Academies Press

A biological warfare agent (BWA) is a microorganism, or a toxin derived from a living organism, that causes disease in humans, plants, or animals or that causes the deterioration of material. The effectiveness of a BWA is greatly reduced if the attack is detected in time for the target population to take appropriate defensive measures. Therefore, the ability to detect a BWA, in particular to detect it before the target population is exposed, will be a valuable asset to defense against biological attacks. The ideal detection system will have quick response and be able to detect a threat plume at a distance from the target population. The development of reliable biological standoff detection systems, therefore, is a key goal. However, testing biological standoff detection systems is difficult because open-air field tests with BWAs are not permitted under international conventions and because the wide variety of environments in which detectors might be used may affect their performance. This book explores the question of how to determine whether or not a biological standoff detection system fulfills its mission reliably if we cannot conduct open-air field tests with live BWAs.

Reprints of Papers by National Research Fellows in the Biological Sciences ...

Reprints of Papers by National Research Fellows in the Biological Sciences ...

by National Research Council (U.S.). Fellowship in Biological Sciences

1928

Journal of the Marine Biological Association of the United Kingdom

Journal of the Marine Biological Association of the United Kingdom

by Marine Biological Association of the United Kingdom

1913

... Report for the Years ...

... Report for the Years ...

by Marine Biological Laboratory (Woods Hole, Mass.)

1912

List of the publications from the Marine Biological Laboratory, from its foundation to the end of 1907 included in 11th report, 1907-08, p. 56-100