Books by "David A. Welch"
11 books found
Reports of Cases in the Supreme Court of Nebraska
by Nebraska. Supreme Court, David Allen Campbell, Guy Ashton Brown, Lorenzo Crounse, Walter Alber Leese, Lee Herdmen, Henry Clay Lindsay, Henry Paxon Stoddart
1915
"Rules of the supreme court. In force February 1, 1914": v. 94, p. vii-xx.
A History of Middle New River Settlements and Contiguous Territory
by David Emmons Johnston
1906 · Pantianos Classics
This history covers the middle New River area from 1654 to 1905 with an emphasis on Mercer County, West Virginia. Mercer County was created in 1837 from Giles and Tazewell counties, Virginia, and was part of Virginia until 1863.
Catalogue of the Books & Manuscripts Comprising the Library of the Late Sir John T. Gilbert
by Dublin Public Libraries, David James O'Donoghue
1918
Linguists with no background in statistics will find this book to be an accessible introduction to statistics. Concepts are explained in non-technical terms, and mathematical formulas are kept to a minimum. The book incorporates SPSS, which is a statistics package that incorporates a point and click interface rather than complex line-commands. Step-by-step instructions are provided for some of the most widely used statistics in linguistics. At the same time, the concepts behind each procedure are also explained. Traditional analyses such as ANOVA and t-tests are included in the book, but linguistic data is often not amenable to such analyses. For this reason, non-parametric and mixed-effects procedures are also introduced.
This groundbreaking book examines portable art collections assembled in the courts of Greater Iran in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Made for members of the royal families or ruling elites, albums were created to preserve and display art, yet they were conceptualized in different ways. David Roxburgh, a leading expert on Persian albums and the art of the book, discusses this diversity and demonstrates convincingly that to look at the practice of album making is to open a vista to a culture of thought about the Persian art tradition. The book considers the album’s formal and physical properties, assembly, and content, as well as the viewer’s experience. Focusing on seven albums created during the Timurid and Safavid dynasties, Roxburgh reconstructs the history and development of this codex form and uses the works of art to explore notions of how art and aesthetics were conceived in Persian court culture. Generously illustrated with over 175 images, many rare and previously unpublished, the book offers a range of new insights into Persian visual culture as well as Islamic art history.
Days of Decision spans a century of American foreign policymaking, from the Spanish- American War of 1898 to the attacks of September 11, 2001. Michael J. Nojeim and David P. Kilroy carefully examine twelve foreign-policy landmarks, each of which played a crucial role in shaping world history and led to profound changes in U.S. foreign policy. Devoting one chapter to each turning point, they place it in its proper historical context, explore its political consequences--primarily the debates and divisions that arose among policymakers--and discuss the aftermath, focusing on its lasting influence on world affairs and the conduct of American diplomacy and foreign affairs. This accessible, introductory text provides students of foreign policy and international relations a deeper understanding of these disciplines' processes and of America's place in the world.
In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, questions persisted about how the potential cataclysm had been allowed to develop. A subsequent congressional investigation focused on what came to be known as the “photo gap”: five weeks during which intelligence-gathering flights over Cuba had been attenuated. In Blind over Cuba, David M. Barrett and Max Holland challenge the popular perception of the Kennedy administration’s handling of the Soviet Union’s surreptitious deployment of missiles in the Western Hemisphere. Rather than epitomizing it as a masterpiece of crisis management by policy makers and the administration, Barrett and Holland make the case that the affair was, in fact, a close call stemming directly from decisions made in a climate of deep distrust between key administration officials and the intelligence community. Because of White House and State Department fears of “another U-2 incident” (the infamous 1960 Soviet downing of an American U-2 spy plane), the CIA was not permitted to send surveillance aircraft on prolonged flights over Cuban airspace for many weeks, from late August through early October. Events proved that this was precisely the time when the Soviets were secretly deploying missiles in Cuba. When Director of Central Intelligence John McCone forcefully pointed out that this decision had led to a dangerous void in intelligence collection, the president authorized one U-2 flight directly over western Cuba—thereby averting disaster, as the surveillance detected the Soviet missiles shortly before they became operational. The Kennedy administration recognized that their failure to gather intelligence was politically explosive, and their subsequent efforts to influence the perception of events form the focus for this study. Using recently declassified documents, secondary materials, and interviews with several key participants, Barrett and Holland weave a story of intra-agency conflict, suspicion, and discord that undermined intelligence-gathering, adversely affected internal postmortems conducted after the crisis peaked, and resulted in keeping Congress and the public in the dark about what really happened. Fifty years after the crisis that brought the superpowers to the brink, Blind over Cuba: The Photo Gap and the Missile Crisis offers a new chapter in our understanding of that pivotal event, the tensions inside the US government during the cold war, and the obstacles Congress faces when conducting an investigation of the executive branch.
"Roots of War presents systematic archival, experimental, and survey research on three psychological factors leading to war--desire for power, exaggerated perception of threat, and justification for force -- set in comparative historical accounts of the unexpected 1914 escalation to world war and the peacefully - resolved 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis."--Provided by publisher.