Books by "John J. Mearsheimer"
2 books found
The third edition of this successful text highlights new international trends toward global governance, nation-building, and human development, while also assessing the extraordinary challenges confronting the United Nations at this critical moment in international affairs, not least being the ubiquity of conflict in Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, and the global threats of disease, climate change, and the retreat from multilateralism by the great powers. A comprehensive guide to the world body’s institutions, procedures, policies, specialized agencies, historic personalities, initiatives, and involvement in world affairs, The New United Nations is organized thematically, blending both topical and chronological explanations, making reference to current scholarly terms and theories. New to this edition: Fully updated chapters and a new Introduction, including discussion of the Paris Climate Change Agreement, the world’s response to COVID-19, and the revival of ultranationalism and great-power rivalry. New sections on the theory and practice of neoliberalism and populism, the UN’s use of the "Responsibility to Protect" in the Middle East, the Arab Spring, and multifaceted roles in the developing world, especially in Africa. Updated analysis of twenty-first-century challenges to collective security, including in Syria and, particularly, in Ukraine. Unique special section on the student Model United Nations experience. Coverage of the UN’s efforts to implement the Sustainable Development Goals. eResources with supportive materials and documents.
In Deceit on the Road to War, John M. Schuessler examines how U.S. presidents have deceived the American public about fundamental decisions of war and peace. Deception has been deliberate, he suggests, as presidents have sought to shift blame for war onto others in some cases and oversell its benefits in others. Such deceit is a natural outgrowth of the democratic process, in Schuessler’s view, because elected leaders have powerful incentives to maximize domestic support for war and retain considerable ability to manipulate domestic audiences. They can exploit information and propaganda advantages to frame issues in misleading ways, cherry-pick supporting evidence, suppress damaging revelations, and otherwise skew the public debate to their benefit. These tactics are particularly effective before the outbreak of war, when the information gap between leaders and the public is greatest. When resorting to deception, leaders take a calculated risk that the outcome of war will be favorable, expecting the public to adopt a forgiving attitude after victory is secured. The three cases featured in the book—Franklin Roosevelt and World War II, Lyndon Johnson and the Vietnam War, and George W. Bush and the Iraq War—test these claims. Schuessler concludes that democracies are not as constrained in their ability to go to war as we might believe and that deception cannot be ruled out in all cases as contrary to the national interest.