Books by "William E. Forbath"
3 books found
For half a century before 1937, populists, progressives, and labor leaders complained bitterly that a "judicial oligarchy" impeded social and economic reform by imposing crippling restraints on trade unions and nullifying legislation that regulated business corporations. A Muted Fury, the first study of this neglected chapter in American political and legal history, explains the origins of hostility toward the courts during the Progressive Era, examines in detail the many measures that antagonists of the judiciary proposed for the curtailment of judicial power, and evaluates the successes and failures of the anti-court movements. Tapping a broad array of sources, including popular literature and unpublished manuscripts, William Ross demonstrates that this widespread fury against the judiciary was muted by many factors, including respect for judicial power, internal divisions among the judiciary's critics, institutional obstacles to reform, and the judiciary's own willingness to mitigate its hostility toward progressive legislation and labor. Ross argues that persistent criticism of the courts influenced judicial behavior, even though the antagonists of the courts failed in their many efforts to curb judicial power. The book's interdisciplinary exploration of the complex interactions among politics, public opinion, judicial decision-making, the legislative process, and the activities of organized interest groups provides fresh insights into the perennial controversy over the scope of judicial power in America. Originally published in 1994. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Lawyering for the Railroad provides the first full account of railroad monopoly power, tracing its sources and effects in the southern political economy. Issues touching on railroad development were major components of politics in the days of both Populism and Progressivism, and railroad attorneys -- often in their role as lobbyists -- were always in the middle of the action. They distributed free passes to legislators, retained the best counsel for their clients, laid out the legal agreements to form monopolies, and instituted practices to ensure quick and favorable settlements for the railroads. In this intriguing work, William G. Thomas introduces the southern attorneys who represented railroads between 1880 and 1916, closely examining their role in the political economy of the South during the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era, a period in which the region experienced sharp change, explosive growth, and heated political contests. Thomas tells his fascinating story with legal department records from some of the largest interstate railroad companies in the South. With the help of these records, he demonstrates how the railroads tried to use the law and the legal process to mold the southern political economy to their ends and what kind of opposition they faced. Standing at the crossroads of business, law, and politics, Lawyering for the Railroad gives context, depth, and specificity to what have been cursory glimpses into the shady world of corporate power in the Gilded Age. From small-town lawyers to big-city firms, the story of the railroad attorneys brings into focus the many ways the interstate railroad transformed the South.
This book examines the ideology of elite lawyers and judges from the Gilded Age through the New Deal. Between 1866 and 1937, a coherent outlook shaped the way the American bar understood the sources of law, the role of the courts, and the relationship between law and the larger society. William M. Wiecek explores this outlook--often called "legal orthodoxy" or "classical legal thought"--which assumed that law was apolitical, determinate, objective, and neutral. American classical legal thought was forged in the heat of the social crises that punctuated the late nineteenth century. Fearing labor unions, immigrants, and working people generally, American elites, including those on the bench and bar, sought ways to repress disorder and prevent political majorities from using democratic processes to redistribute wealth and power. Classical legal thought provided a rationale that assured the legitimacy of the extant distribution of society's resources. It enabled the legal suppression of unions and the subordination of workers to management's authority. As the twentieth-century U.S. economy grew in complexity, the antiregulatory, individualistic bias of classical legal thought became more and more distanced from reality. Brittle and dogmatic, legal ideology lost legitimacy in the eyes of both laypeople and ever-larger segments of the bar. It was at last abandoned in the "constitutional revolution of 1937", but--as Wiecek argues in this detailed analysis--nothing has arisen since to replace it as an explanation of what law is and why courts have such broad power in a democratic society.